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This is an Op
which perAbstract – Oil palm is an important industrial, livelihood and food crop in Ghana. Smallholders produce the
bulk of the palm fruits and small-scale processors, mainly women, produce most of the crude palm oil. Poor
practices lead to a high proportion of free fatty acids in the crude palm oil and the processors thus cannot
access remunerative national and international markets. Exploratory and diagnostic studies identiﬁed the
absence of rules and regulations governing processing as a major factor. An innovation platform was
convened and facilitated to remove the identiﬁed institutional constraints. Based on event tracing, this paper
reports a study of the effects of the innovation platform’s interventions and how these were achieved.
Institutional entrepreneurs are shown to play important roles: they mobilised resources such as expertise,
knowledge, access to information and high-level political power to inﬂuence small-scale processors to adopt
alternative practices. The institutional changes observed are shown to arise in cooperation between
traditional authorities (chiefs), the district legislature and authorities at the national level, who together
institutionalised the experimental actions and processes taken in the study area. The institutional elements
they most affected were: rules and regulations, the legitimacy of new practices and organisational
arrangements, co-generation of knowledge, material resources, and the strategic and communication skills of
key actors.
Keywords: oil palm / free fatty acids / smallholders / innovation platforms
Résumé – Plateformes d’Innovation et changement institutionnel : le cas des petits producteurs
d’huile de palme au Ghana.Au Ghana, l’huile de palme est un produit alimentaire et industriel important
ainsi qu’une ressource monétaire indispensable aux petits producteurs, qui fournissent l’essentiel des
régimes de fruits. Les petits transformateurs, des femmes pour la plupart, produisent la plus grande part
de la production d’huile de palme brute. Du fait de techniques inappropriées, ces huiles contiennent une
grande proportion d’acides gras libres et les transformateurs ne peuvent donc pas avoir accès aux grands
marchés, nationaux et internationaux, les plus rentables. Des diagnostics préliminaires ont identiﬁé
l’absence de règles et de réglementation sur la transformation comme une contrainte majeure. Une
plateforme d’innovation a été établie pour réﬂéchir à ces contraintes institutionnelles et agir sur elles. En
se basant sur le suivi de ses travaux, cet article rapporte les effets de cette plateforme d’innovation et
discute de la façon dont ils ont été obtenus. Les entrepreneurs institutionnels jouent un rôle important, par
exemple ils mobilisent l’expertise, les connaissances, l’accès à l’information ainsi qu’au réseau politique
de haut niveau et ont motivé les petites transformatrices à adopter des pratiques alternatives. Les
changements institutionnels observés émergent de la coopération entre les autorités traditionnelles
(chefs), les représentants locaux de l’État et les autorités nationales, qui, ensemble, ont institutionnalisé
les actions expérimentales dans les régions étudiées. Les éléments institutionnels les plus signiﬁcatifs
sont : les réglementations et les règles, la légitimité des nouvelles pratiques et les arrangements
organisationnels, la co-production des connaissances, les ressources matérielles, et les compétences
stratégiques et de communication des acteurs clefs.
Mots clés : palmier à huile / acides gras libres / petits exploitants / plateformes d’innovationding author: y_nsiah@yahoo.co.uk
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A growing body of research that uses a systems perspective
to analyse agricultural innovation (see Klerkx et al., 2012, for a
review of systems approaches to agricultural innovation) has
shown that innovation is a co-evolutionary process, marked by
simultaneous and interconnected changes in technology,
markets and value chains, land tenure systems, and input,
certiﬁcation and quality control arrangements (e.g., Biggs,
2007; Adjei-Nsiah et al., 2007; Hounkonnou et al., 2012;
Kilelu et al., 2013). Innovation platforms (IPs) are increasingly
deployed to stimulate and support such changes (e.g., Francis
et al., 2016, in press). IPs bring together key domain actors
from a sector, territory, watershed, or administrative entity to
negotiate the innovation process and mobilise resources in
support of it (Ayele et al., 2012; Hounkonnou et al., 2012). A
number of studies analyse IP management and facilitation
(Ngwenya and Hagmann, 2001; Adekunle and Fatunbi, 2012;
van Paassen et al., 2013) but despite some notable exceptions
(Ayele et al., 2012; Nederlof and Pyburn, 2012; Kilelu et al.,
2013), there is limited detailed analysis of what makes IPs
effective as a tool for smallholder innovation, and especially
how IPs address the institutional dimension of innovation.
The purpose of this article is to investigate how IPs act as
vehicles for institutional change by drawing on literature of
institutional entrepreneurship and by applying event tracing to
study a multi-stakeholder platform located at Kwaebibirem
District, Ghana. The study was carried out from mid-2010 to
end 2013, under the Convergence of Sciences - Strengthening
Innovation Systems (CoS-SIS) programme, focusing on the
role of the IP in opening opportunities for innovation in small-
scale crude palm oil (CPO) processing.
2 Theoretical framework: IPs as hybrid
forums for institutional entrepreneurship
Research on innovation as a systemic and co-evolutionary
process emphasizes that it is about changing the status quo
in incumbent systems (Geels and Schot, 2007; Hekkert et al.,
2007; Hall and Clark, 2010) that in the context of sub-Saharan
Africa are often associated with institutional structures
unfavourable to smallholders (Hounkonnou et al., 2012).
Conﬁgurations of institutions connect and sustain what has
been called the ‘socio-technical regime’, the whole set of
technologies, practices, artefacts, behaviours, laws, regulations
and norms (deﬁned as the ‘rules of the game’) that keep a
dominant economic system (production, trade and consump-
tion) in a dynamically stable state (Fuenfschilling and Truffer,
2016; Holtz et al., 2008). They structure political, social and
economic incentives and sanctions in human exchange
(North, 1990).
Incumbent socio-technical regimes represent the status quo
in terms of production, trade and consumption (Geels, 2005;
Hounkonnou et al., 2012). Studies show that purposeful regime
change requires active reform measures (Biggs, 2007; Farla
et al., 2012), typically ﬁrst developed in so-called niches where
co-learning from experimentation, collective action and
reconﬁguration of personal and organisational relations can
generate alternatives (Elzen et al., 2012). The transformative
work in such niches has been called ‘effective reformism’Page 2(Roep et al., 2003; Klerkx et al., 2010), or ‘anchoring of
innovations’ (Elzen et al., 2012). The individuals who exercise
agency to bring about such changes have been conceptualised
as institutional entrepreneurs (Pacheco et al., 2010; van
Paassen et al., 2014). They are driven either by self-interest or
more altruistic motives, by internal conviction, or by external
pressures that challenge existing structures. They may work on
both, informal (e.g., norms, practices, belief systems), or formal
institutions (e.g., property rights, government policy, standards,
etc.). The mechanisms and strategies they use often include
(Pacheco et al., 2010): 1) advocacy and mobilizing collective
action (building networks) to change power structures,
2) changing prevalent framings of problems and solutions,
or 3) ‘bending’ existing institutions towards new uses (referred
to as ‘institutional bricolage’), for example, by building on
positive deviance (Biggs, 2007). Research on the collective
efforts of institutional entrepreneurs connects with studies of
IPs (Kilelu et al., 2013; Ayele et al., 2012) and innovation
champions (Klerkx et al., 2013) as enablers of purposeful
change. Actors pursuing innovation goals create new relation-
ships through which to mobilise material, power and ﬁnancial
resources (Klerkx et al., 2010). IPs can be seen as ‘hybrid
forums’ positioned between niches and regimes (Elzen et al.,
2012). Their members engage in niche activity but at the same
time are connected to the incumbent socio-technical regime.
However, IPs are not a magic bullet that can solve all
smallholder development problems. While they try to change
the power structures that keep the incumbent system ‘locked-
in’ and unfavourable to smallholders, IP members themselves
are often part of the incumbent socio-technical regime and their
diverse reasons for participation may lead to heightened
conﬂict rather than reduction of tensions along a value chain.
The skills of negotiation and facilitation of power differences
are necessary but might not be available to an IP (e.g., Leeuwis,
2000). Further, a funding agency might have difﬁculty
accepting that how IPs’ actions will work out is not predictable
and can have unintended consequences.3 The case: Ghana’s oil palm domain
Oil palm is an important crop in the economy of Ghana.
Parts are used as fodder, rooﬁng material, and wine; the
mesocarp and kernel are the main sources of cooking oil and
major ingredients in cosmetics. Industrial by-products from
processing the kernel include activated carbon and pozolana
cement, and kernel cake used as a poultry feed supplement.
Ghana’s demand for crude palm oil (CPO) is about 250,000 MT
(MPOC, 2009) but the country produces only 233,000 MT.
Female small-scale processors produce most of the CPO
output (Osei-Amponsah et al., 2014). Their practice of storing
palm fruits for between two and four weeks before processing
leads to CPO with a high free fatty acid (FFA) content. This
is not utilised by the reﬁning industry because removal of
FFAs incurs high oil losses and costs (Gibon et al., 2007). As
a result, the country imports large quantities of CPO for
industrial production of reﬁned cooking oil, high value
cosmetics and luxury soaps. Small-scale processors mostly
sell to local markets and often ﬁnd it difﬁcult to make
sufﬁcient sales especially during peak fruit production from
February to May.of 9
Activity Purpose Technology/actor 
Cutting of fresh fruit
bunches 















Breaking of cooked 
fruits for oil 
extraction
To separate the 
oil from the mash
Manual with axe or 
cutlass by farmers
On bare ground
Partially mechanized using 




Boiling oil in drums by 
women
Separation of oil 
from water and other 
materials
Hand picking of fruits and 
drying of fruits on bare 
ground by women
Cooking by women 
using metal drums
Sterilization of fruits
Fig. 1. Steps in palm fruit processing.
Fig. 1. Étapes de l’élaboration de l’huile de palme.
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of rules and policies governing operators’ practices. In addition
to the problem of the high FFA content, the use of old lorry tyres
as cheap fuel for fruit boiling affects CPOquality and human and
environmental health. Figure 1 sketches the steps involved in
extracting CPO by small-scale processors. Infrastructure is
inadequate and efﬁcient processing equipment is lacking, further
competitiveness in remunerative industrial and international
markets. Artisanal processors have a potential to meet Ghana’s
industrial and household needs in so far as they procure the bulk
of the palm fruits produced in Ghana, yet they receive little
government support in terms of training, access to credit and
efﬁcient equipment. The government’s oil palm sector policy
focuses largely on out-grower schemes attached to large-scale
processing mills. However, in practice out-growers often send
fruits meant for the mills to the small-scale processors.Page 34 The oil palm IP
The oil palm IP, established in July 2010 under the CoS-SIS
Programme, opened a niche for institutional experimentation
and for creating tested options for reforming the regime. Its
eight initial members (ﬁve men, three women) were identiﬁed
through stakeholder analysis carried out jointly by the
facilitator (the senior author) and other stakeholders in the
CPO industry. They were a smallholder farmer, an artisanal
processor, a CPO miller, a representative of the Ministry of
Food and Agriculture (MoFA), two from the Ghana Regional
Appropriate Technology and Industrial Services (GRATIS) and
one each from the Export Promotion Authority (GEPA), and
the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA). This mix of local
and nationally prominent actors constituted the IP as a hybrid
forum operating between niche and regime. Its local base isof 9
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which produces the bulk of Ghana’s CPO. It has a population of
about 193,000 comprising some 150 villages (2010 Census).
Agriculture employs about 77% of the work force and artisanal
CPO processing is the main economic activity, employing
particularly women (Osei-Amponsah et al., 2012).
Following an exploratory study (Adjei-Nsiah et al., 2012)
and a diagnostic study (Osei-Amponsah et al., 2012), the initial
institutional constraint identiﬁed by the IP was the absence of
rules and regulations governing the practices of small-scale
processors. The challenges deﬁned by IPmembers were (i) what
could be changed to enable artisanal processors to improve the
quality of their CPO and (ii) how could they be helped to access
export markets for high quality CPO. In response to these
constraints, technological innovations (exploring alternative
fuels for boiling oil palm fruits) and institutional innovations
(developing different market channels and complying with
higher production standards)were proposed.While the proposed
technical and institutional innovations are not new or radical in
the absolute sense, for the smallholder context they can be
considered innovative as they change the existing situation and
propose newways of operating smallholder agricultural systems
and value chains to beneﬁt the smallholders (in line with
Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Kilelu et al., 2013). Furthermore, the
proposed innovations may at ﬁrst sight be positive for
smallholders but could have negative (unintended) side-effects
in the long run (Wigboldus et al., 2016).5 Research methods
Two main approaches were applied: action researching,
comprising iterative cycles of planning, executing and learning
from a series of multi-actor inquiries, institutional experiments,
and PhD studies, and event analysis that involved documenting
in real time the actions of IP members and the changes that
could be analysed to emanate from these actions, a form of
Theory-Guided Process Enquiry (for details see Kilelu et al.,
2013; Jiggins et al., 2016a, 2016b). Two causal hypotheses
were formulated for the analysis: (1) that the events were
caused by actions of the IP and (2) that they were caused by
exertion of power by the IP and/or other actors.
As the IP began to function, information on key events in
the domain, the activities and decisions of the platform, the
facilitator’s comments on these and their immediate effects,
were documented, then reported and analysed at periodic
workshops that brought together the COS-SIS programme’s
Research Associate (RA) facilitators from the three countries
involved (Benin, Mali, Ghana), national coordinators and an
RA support team (so-called RAworkshops). A narrative (i.e. a
brief but rich description) about the IP and its context was
written by the facilitator for each four-months period,
complemented by narrative reports by the National Programme
and Regional Coordinators concerning events in the domain as
a whole, and in the national or international context, and the
actions taken by themselves and by members of the national
ProgrammeManagement Team. In addition, a facilitation diary
was maintained throughout, noting how the facilitator
interacted with IP members and supported their work. During
the RAworkshops all these data were examined against the two
causal hypotheses for their explanatory power.Page 46 Findings and analysis
At the ﬁrst meeting of the IP (23 July 2010, Legon) the
members decided the institutional constraints they wanted to
tackle, established their baseline understanding of the regime
factors involved, and analysed in-depth the identiﬁed
constraints as well as the interventions that might modify or
remove them. The constraints were then prioritised by the
members, who then discussed what might be required to bring
about the desired changes, and identiﬁed activities, by whom,
to accomplish these. Such analyses were periodically repeated
throughout the study period to capture the evolution of the IP’s
understanding of the causal interactions between institutional
constraints and opportunities for innovation. The facilitator
also began sketching the structure of the linkages among
platform members and key actors in other organisations in the
domain so as to get a view of how the regime intersected with
the niche. These actor linkage diagrams were periodically
updated to capture changes in linkage structures as the tasks,
competencies and functions of the IP matured in response to
both the internal dynamics among members and the external
inﬂuences emanating from the context (Fig. 2A, B, C).
In early 2011, this analysis showed that producers,
processors and millers at the District level were linked by
virtue of their membership in the Kwaebibirem Palm Millers
Association (KBDA). In addition, the farmer member of the IP
had close links with the Director of MoFA but none of the other
members from the key public sector organisations even knew
each other (Fig. 2A). The links that evolved subsequently are
presented in a later section. Here we focus on the rules and
regulations governing the practices of artisanal processors.
Once these had been changed to allow and support their entry
into remunerative markets for good quality CPO, we also
examine how the processors could be linked to export
entrepreneurs and how processors could be organised into
groups to facilitate acquisition of equipment for improving
productivity.6.1 Rules governing processing practices
We ﬁrst present how the IP tackled the use of lorry tyres as
fuel for boiling palm fruits (with the aim of discontinuing their
use and come up with alternative fuels). Initially the IP had no
information on who was involved and why, or on the adverse
consequences of using tyres on CPO quality and processors’
health. It tasked IPmembers from regulatory organisations with
relevant expertise (the GSA and the EPA - Environmental
Protection Agency) to study these issues and report back, so
that the IP could share the information with key policy and
value chain actors. On the basis of data supplied by these
agencies, they found that tyre use was universal because tyres
were cheap, readily available, and could be left to burn
unattended all night while the fruits were boiled, but that the
practice indeed had signiﬁcant harmful environmental and
human health effects.
After discussion of this information, the IP delegated three
members (the processor and miller, who were also KBDA
members, and the District Director of Agriculture (DDA) to share
theﬁndings with the PresidingMember of the KBDA. Convinced

























Fig. 2. IP actor linkages at three points in time: (A) 20 July 2010; (B) 25 February 2011; (C) 30 September 2012. Dashed lines represent a weak
link. GRATIS: Ghana Appropriate Technology and Industrial Services; GSA: Ghana Standard Authority; GEPA: Ghana Export Promotion
Authority; MoFA: Ministry of Food and Agriculture; EPA: Environmental Protection Agency (source: TGPI data and actor linkage analyses).
Fig. 2. Liens entre les acteurs de la plateforme d’innovation à trois moments : (A) 20 Juillet 2010; (B) 25 Février 2011; (C) 30 Septembre 2012.
Les lignes pointillées représentent un lien faible. GRATIS : Ghana Appropriate Technology and Industrial Services ; GSA : Ghana Standard
Authority ; GEPA : Ghana Export Promotion Authority ; MoFA : Ministry of Food and Agriculture ; EPA : Environmental Protection Agency
(source : TGPI data and actor linkage analyses).
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Assembly. After further discussion the Assembly in principle
agreed to pass by-laws to ban the use of tyres and force mills to
relocate to the outskirts of communities. It asked the IP to help
explain the need for such rules to local people. The IP ﬁrst
organised a meeting with the Kwaebibirem Millers’ Association,
and then meetings with mill owners, mill workers, farmers,
processors and chiefswithin themajor processing communities in
the District, to share the information with them. In one village,
Subi, which is home to about 16 mills, the community agreed
enthusiastically with the need for change since people there were
already concerned about the pollution and its effects on health. Its
chief immediately imposed a ban on the use of the lorry tyres, as
well as a ﬁne of ﬁfty Ghana Cedis (about 12 €) for using them.
However, most processors at ﬁrst were unwilling to stop using
tyres due to the difﬁculty of ﬁnding an equally cheap and readily
available substitute.An IPmember, a processor herself, suggested
ﬁbre cake and empty fruit bunches, the by-products of processing,
as an alternative. A few other processors tried this option and
discovered that their fuel costs were reduced by as much as 50%.
Thus a waste product was transformed into a resource and
potential income generator, while eliminating harmful efﬂuent.
The KBDA then felt conﬁdent to enact a by-law to ban the use of
the tyres throughout the district. The IP later identiﬁed the
following contributions of the IP to this outcome: re-framingof the
problem, assembling data, experimentation and learning from
collective action, information-sharing and advocacy, development
of alternatives, lobbying.6.2 Linking artisanal processors to remunerative
markets
Change in processing practices (especially reducing the
storage time of fruits to lower the FFA content, which in turnPage 5reduces the amount of CPO that can be extracted (Osei-
Amponsah et al., 2014) is relevant for processors only if they
can access remunerative markets for high quality CPO. In a
separate ﬁeld experiment (Osei-Amponsah et al., 2014) the
women demonstrated that they could improve the quality of
their CPO. The IP member from the GEPA established links
between the processors to a number of export entrepreneurs.
One subsequently became a member of the IP and helped the IP
to mobilise resources to send CPO samples for laboratory
analysis in Europe. As their understanding of the export
potential grew, the processors began negotiating with another
exporter who expressed strong interest in investing in the sector
but a deal did not materialise because the parties could not
agree on a price. The negotiations took place when CPO was
scarce on the local market and the women could ﬁnd a ready
domestic market. However, they learned that it was the high
cost of artisanal processing, resulting from the use of obsolete
and inefﬁcient equipment that reduced their product’s
competitiveness in export markets. The artisanal processors
at this stage found they could beneﬁt from producing good
quality CPO only by accessing limited niche markets, such as
Africans living overseas, local super markets and educational
institutions, which would mean upgrading their production
standards.
6.2.1 Organisation of smallholders into groups
To help improve the competitiveness of the artisanal sector
the IP next decided to organise the processors into structured
groups and to assist them to obtain grants to upgrade their
equipment to meet standards in niche markets. Subsequently,
the member from the GEPA arranged funding from his
organisation for training courses for millers and about
300 processors in ﬁve CPO processing communities in
Kwaebibirem District on group formation and management.of 9
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through 2014 were receiving training to prepare them to solicit
and manage equipment grants.
6.3 Changing linkages and IP composition
The linkages among IP members and between them and
others changed over time (Fig. 2A, B, C). Initially the IP did
not, for example, include an EPA representative although the IP
in its ﬁrst year of operations identiﬁed environmental issues as
a priority problem in small-scale CPO processing. It was only
in February 2011, when the facilitator approached the
Executive Director of EPA that a CPO expert was assigned
to join the IP. We have already seen that the IP, once the
processors had demonstrated that they could improve their
CPO quality, decided in May 2012 to invite an exporter to
become a member. Meanwhile, the GSA member, who had
earlier played a major role by carrying out the study of the
effects of local processing practices on the environment and
human health, showed less interest in the activities of the IP as
it moved to consider market access. At the start of the IP, the
relationships among the organisations represented in the IP
were sporadic and loose. These only became stronger once
members began to understand the contributions each of their
organizations could make to support each other’s goals with
respect to the development of the oil palm domain.
6.4 Institutional entrepreneurs
Pacheco et al. (2010) identify various mechanisms and
strategies institutional entrepreneurs’ use, including advocacy,
networking, mobilising collective actions to change power
structures and prevalent framings of problems and solutions,
and sometimes “bending” existing institutions towards new
uses. The RA’s and IP’s records show that ﬁve persons played
major entrepreneurial roles in championing the activities of the
platform at different points in time.
6.4.1 The Presiding Member (PM) of the Kwaebibirem
District Assembly
Although he was not a member of the IP, he used his skills
and inﬂuence to organize meetings between IP members and
the executives of KBDA and later also the General Assembly.
In this way, he provided the IP with access to local policy
makers, brokered information sharing, promoted cooperation
between the District Assembly and the IP, and supported their
collective actions in framing a new regulatory framework for
the small-scale CPO processing industry. The PM was
motivated to champion the IP’s cause because of a passion
for modernizing the small-scale CPO processing industry,
thereby demonstrating the Assembly’s and his own compe-
tence and concern for the public interest
6.4.2 The Director of Agriculture in Kwaebibirem District
(DDA)
The Director of Agriculture in Kwaebibirem District
(DDA) assisted both the IP and women processors to overcome
bureaucratic barriers by mobilising the District administrationPage 6and legislature as well as the Traditional Authorities (Chiefs) to
advance the cause of the IP. He identiﬁed the PM as a potential
champion. He lobbied for adoption throughout the District of
the alternative processing practices developed through the IP,
and was responsible for sustaining stakeholders’ interest in
strengthening the sector as a whole, though recognising that
their stakes were different.
6.4.3 The representative of the processors on the IP
The representative of the processors on the IP, here
identiﬁed as ‘P’. She encouraged and assisted activities to ﬁnd,
test, and assess (technically and economically) a source of fuel
that could be a viable alternative to lorry tyres. She supported
and promoted the new technological opportunities that opened
up through advocacy, lobbying the legislature and Chiefs, and
analysed the economics of differences sources of fuel. She
actively engaged in framing the alternative fuel as a viable
option so as to make it appealing to the widest possible
audience.
The DDA and P had been identiﬁed during the initial
stakeholder analysis and their entrepreneurial skills were a
major reason for inviting them to join the IP. They were
motivated to join and to remain because they saw the IP as a
vehicle for advancing their own ambitions to develop the
opportunities for the small-scale sector that had been neglected
by researchers and policy makers. P was especially motivated
by the readiness of IP members to value her contribution as a
female entrepreneur, and give her an equal chance to speak and
play an advocacy role.
6.4.4 The representative of the GEPA on the IP
He contributed information, material and ﬁnancial resour-
ces from his agency, linked processors to exporters, and helped
organise the processors into groups. He is driven by the
opportunity opened by the IP to export Ghanaian CPO. His
commitment is notable given the focus of Ghana’s oil palm
sector development policy on large-scale (out-grower) planta-
tions and processing mills, and the active discouragement of
small-scale processers who were seen as unable to build a
modern industry although they captured the bulk of the
country’s smallholder palm fruit harvest.
6.4.5 The doctoral student employed under the CoS-SIS
Programme
She was responsible for the diagnostic studies that fed into
the initial work of the IP, carried out ﬁeld experiments with
groups of women processors into their practices and the impact
on CPO quality, and arranged for the quality of CPO from a
range of fruit storage and processing options to be laboratory
tested. She established that artisanal processors actually are
able to manipulate their CPO quality to satisfy international
criteria by adapting the storage periods of fresh palm fruit and
by switching to alternative fuels. She showed that in the
absence of access to higher price markets, the women preferred
to produce lower quality CPO because longer storage periods
allowed them to extract a larger proportion of oil (with high
FFA content) to supply the local market (Osei-Amponsah et al.,
2014). She worked closely with the facilitator and played aof 9
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Research Institute (OPRI), which had hitherto neglected
artisanal processing. As a woman she was indispensable in
networking with the local processors.
6.4.6 The IP’s facilitator
He was engaged by the CoS-SIS programme for the
purpose of carrying out exploratory studies (Adjei-Nsiah et al.,
2013), analysing actor networks, convening and facilitating the
platform and carrying out relevant event analyses. In addition he
played an indispensable role by coordinating and networking
among the various actors to ensure their timely and appropriate
contributions. If IPs are to become an effective instrument for the
kind of institutional changes that can create realistic oppor-
tunities for smallholder farm innovation, as described in the case
study reported here, there must be recognition among donors,
governments and development administrators of the need to fund
facilitation of IPs and the exploratory and diagnostic research
that supports their activities
7 Discussion and conclusions
This case study explores how an IPmodiﬁed the institutional
regime so as to enable smallholder innovation. The ﬁndings
support the propositions of the CoS-SIS Programme that the
institutional contexts experienced by smallholders in sub-
Saharan Africa is a major impediment to them becoming more
productive, and that IPs actually can foment institutional change
(Hounkonnou et al., 2012). However, a few additional
observations are in order. In the ﬁrst place, the research that
supported the IPs work was only partly of a social science or
speciﬁcally institutional nature. The (natural science) experi-
ments with the women to improve CPO quality, as well as the
scientiﬁc analysis of the toxicity of tyre smoke played a major
role by creating new knowledge and a sense of common purpose
among key actors. Furthermore, the institutional experimenta-
tion only had an impact in the villages in the district directly
involved, and further scaling-up and scaling-out of the
institutional innovation was not yet witnessed, despite the
platform having wider domain representatives as members. This
implies that while the platform can create enabling conditions
which have the potential to inﬂuence change elsewhere (Kilelu
et al., 2013), platform impacts cannot be directly extrapolated to
another locality such as another district. This points to the
importance to think more strategically about which scales in
agricultural systems and value chains need to be engagedwith by
innovation platform, and hence which types of members need to
be recruited (Hermans et al., 2016).
Secondly, in the course of implementation, the oil palm IP
became quite independent of COS-SIS in terms of choosing its
priorities and mobilising resources. The programme had
indicated that CPO quality should be the priority entry point
for the IP’s work, based on the diagnostic study. However, the
IP chose to focus ﬁrst on the use of lorry tyres, causing the
programme’s Mid-Term Review in 2011 to conclude that the IP
had little impact potential. The IP skilfully followed its initial
discoveries by actions that led to signiﬁcant quality improve-
ments, modernisation and re-organisation of the sector, and
development of its export potential. However, while though toPage 7make positive changes, there may also be unintended side
effects (Wigboldus et al., 2016), which could not yet be
observed within the timeframe of the research, but this would
need to be a point an IP reﬂects on.
A third point is that not all domain actors can be assumed to
be pleased by innovation in the sector. The large mills and
plantations play important roles in the political-economy. They
dislike the fact that, because artisanal processors successfully
compete for the fresh palm fruits produced by smallholder
farmers, the large mills work below capacity. As a result, for a
long time Government policy has favoured the large-scale
industry. The IP took care to develop its own expertise,
evidence, and networks of inﬂuence before it engaged with
high-level government ﬁgures. The careful exploratory
analysis of the domain (Adjei-Nsiah et al., 2012), stakeholder
analysis, and composition of IP membership on the basis of
individual’s enthusiasm to explore what changes were needed
and possible, proved to be important in achieving the outcomes
documented. In relation to this point, the case study also
underlines the importance of constituting IPs as hybrid forums
(Elzen et al., 2012). The IP can be seen as a space in between a
niche that provides space to experiment with institutional and
socio-technical alternatives and the regime, as the case study
shows the importance of engaging from the start with actors
positioned in the prevalent institutional regime so that co-
learning can occur, new information can become embedded in
regime thinking, and networks of inﬂuence. However, an IP
cannot be immune from larger political concerns and power
games, as incumbent players may also enact counter strategies
(Smink et al., 2015), and the innovation platforms themselves
are the scene of power struggles (Cullen et al., 2014).
The ﬁnal point we want to make concerns the institutional
entrepreneurs. We show that institutional entrepreneurs are
brokering, lobbying, framing, networking and fomenting
concerted action with the explicit purpose of changing the
rules of the game. Using an institutional entrepreneur
perspective to analyse innovation platforms can be helpful
in identifying what types of actors should be present on the
innovation platform, to make use of their change agency.
However, since our analysis has tentatively engaged with the
concept of institutional entrepreneurs for this case study, some
relevant future questions need to be addressed. How can we
identify institutional entrepreneurs outside the platform (from
within or outside the incumbent regime) and how can they be
enrolled on the platform? How can we balance the informal
emergence of institutional entrepreneurs and the appointment
of institutional entrepreneurs? How do we ensure that their
active roles are not to the detriment of input from other actors
on the innovation platform who are not institutional
entrepreneurs? We still know far too little about institutional
entrepreneurs, innovation champions and brokers in the context
of African agricultural change (Klerkx et al., 2013) their roles
and effects, and the limits to what they might achieve, which
indicates that further research on this topic is needed.
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